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Abstract  
Bachelor thesis in Business Administration, Accounting & Industrial and Financial 
Management, Spring Term 2015 
Authors: Peter Gedeck and Daniel Vigh  
Mentor: Gunnar Rimmel   
Title: Reserve replacement in the oil and gas industry - A study on cost differences  
Background and the question at issue: When attempting to increment oil and gas reserves, an 
oil and gas company typically has two possibilities, either to prospect and develop reserves or to 
acquire reserves through a takeover of another company with proved reserves. In this thesis, the 
reader will find an approximated answer to the question at issue about which of these alternatives 
is the most cost effective.  
Purpose: The thesis was written with the intent to fill some of the holes in the academic literature 
regarding the cost effectiveness, related to the increment of oil and gas reserves. The paper also 
contains a discussion about the determents of value and costs in the oil and gas industry, written 
with the intention to contribute to the illumination of the economical dynamics of the industry.  
Delimitations: Some generalizations have been made in this thesis in order to increment the 
transparency and perspicuousness of the study.    
Methodology: This thesis was enabled by a thorough study of relevant academic research and 
empirical data, e.g. annual reports and press releases. The costs and outcomes of exploration 
activities between the years 2009-2013 was gathered from the ten largest oil and gas companies, 
according to the market capitalization per 2015-04-15, and compared to eight acquisitions that 
where considered to be a appropriate.   
Conclusions: The findings of this study indicate that, from a strictly economic perspective, that 
the alternative to prospect and develop oil and gas reserves is the most cost effective way to 
increment reserves, although the findings are not statistically significant.    
Possible stakeholders: This thesis should be interesting to anyone who takes particular interest 
in the oil and gas industry. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Klaus Mohn stated in his Ph.D. thesis that “As all fossil fuels are non-renewable, access to 
producible reserves is a special and critical issue. Unless oil and gas production volumes are 
replaced through successful exploration efforts, the basis for future production will be 
undermined”. (Mohn, 2008, p. 16). Gilbert & Scheck (2014) reported on the matter of major oil 
and gas companies failing to replace their production with new reserves. The authors highlighted 
the raising prospecting and commercializing costs of oil and gas companies during the last few 
years for three of the branches giants: Chevron Corp., Exxon Mobil Corp and Royal Dutch Shell 
PLC.  
These facts indicate that oil and gas companies invest more money in finding less oil than they 
did some years ago. Vivoda (2009) confirms this trend, reporting that five majors of the industry 
only replaced 51.7 % of their produced oil between the years 2003 - 2007.  
Macalister (2014) reported that “The costs of a trouble-prone drilling programme in Arctic waters 
off Alaska have contributed to Shell being forced to issue a shock profit warning”. The author 
continues to explain that Shell spent USD 5 billion in 2013 on Arctic drilling “without any 
tangible result”. Macdonald-Smith (2014) reported on the escalating development costs of the 
Gorgon liquefied natural gas project in Western Australia, in which Shell has a 25 % stake. “The 
original budget for the first three LNG trains was $US37billion, but it has been twice increased 
and is now $US17 billion higher, with some doubts still whether that will be the final figure”. 
Steven Kopits, an analyst at Princeton Energy Advisors, claimed that “Oil majors are being eaten 
alive on exploration costs” (Philips, 2014). In the article “Why Oil Prices Haven't Gone Crazy“ 
Philips further presents the following figure:  
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Figure 1. Crude production and Capital expenditure. Source: Philips (2014) 
The figure above illustrates that oil and gas majors have increased their combined capital 
expenditures from USD 50 billion in the year 2000 to USD 250 billion in the year 2012. Despite 
a fivefold increase in capital expenditures, the companies’ crude production was roughly the 
same in the year 2012 as in the year 2000.  
An alternative approach to replacing fading resources is an acquisition of a smaller oil and gas 
company with proven reserves. 
Kang & Gismatullin (2010) reported that the Korean National Oil Corporation (KNOC) won 
control over the Scottish oil producer Dana Petroleum PLC. The offer was of a hostile nature and 
represented a 59 % premium over the closing price of Dana Petroleum’s shares “the day before 
Dana first announced the approach July 1”.  
Schaps & Zhdannikov (2015) reported on Shell announcing a cash and share offer for BG Group 
for approximately 47 billion GBP on 8 April 2015. The offer represents a premium of 
approximately 50 % over the closing price of BG Group shares on 7 April 2015. 
Oil companies’ ability to replace their production with new findings in a cost effective manner is 
very important for the companies’ long-term survival, but not least to meet the world’s energy 
demand. The matter of companies spending more to get less oil and gas becomes even more 
intriguing when it’s paired up with OPECs outlook of the world’s long-term oil demand. The 
outlook is presented in the figure below: 
3 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Long-term oil demand. Source: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (2014) 
According to this forecast, the world’s oil demand will increase by 23.44% from the year 2013 to 
the year 2040. Indeed, there seems to be some urgent issues that need to be solved by the world’s 
oil and gas companies.      
Mohn (2008) argued that empirical studies of the exploration process conducted by oil and gas 
companies are necessary to gain insight into the fundamentals of oil and gas supply.  
Furthermore, Mohn (2008) reasoned that empirical studies of the investment process among oil 
and gas companies is a key factor for understanding the economics of oil and gas supply. Mohn 
(2008) also expressed the belief that such empirical studies may be interesting not only for 
academics but also for strategists and governments 
1.2 Problem discussion  
In practice, an oil and gas company looking to increase their reserves can choose between two 
possibilities. The first would be an acquisition of another, preferably smaller, company with 
proven oil and gas reserves. The second possibility for the companies would be the task of 
finding, prospecting and commercializing oil and gas reserves on their own. 
Given the assumption that an oil and gas company desires to be a long-term competitor in the 
branch, or aspires to be an attractive target for a company looking for acquisitions the 
replacement of the oil and gas reserves is essential.     
The matter of oil and gas companies’ methods and costs to increase oil and gas reserves is an 
important subject, both from the companies’ perspective as well as a larger macro perspective.  
Oil and gas companies have to replace produced oil and gas with new reserves with an economic 
rationally method to avoid being “eaten alive”, as well as meet the increasing world demand for 
oil and gas. This is a massive challenge, which have to be addressed in a rigorous and efficient 
manner.  
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As indicated above, an oil and gas company might face the reality of producing more oil and gas 
than they manage to replace. A replacement ratio, which could be considered healthy, should 
always be over 100 % (Vivoda, 2009). On the 27th of February 2006, Schwartz (2006) stated that 
the reserve replacement is the best indicator of a company’s ability to maintain or increase 
production in the future.  
1.3 The question at issue 
One of the intriguing questions in the governance of an oil and gas company is how to handle 
fading reserves. A likely supplementary question is the one of what kind of replacement would be 
most cost effective. Would it be more cost effective to acquire a smaller company with reserves 
or to prospect and to commercialize oil and gas in own regime? From these reflections, the 
following question at issue is derived for examination in this study: 
While looking to increment fading oil and gas reserves, are there any cost differences between 
acquisitions of companies with proven reserves as opposed to the prospection and 
commercialization of unexploited resources? 
1.4 Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate potential cost differences between exploring and 
commercializing oil and gas reserves for oil companies, compared to takeovers of other oil and 
gas companies with the intention to gain access to proven oil and gas reserves. Further, this study 
will illuminate the economic dynamics and decisions of the branch that are related to the 
replacement of oil and gas reserves.  
1.5 Delimitations 
In order to fulfill the purpose of this paper and answering the question at issue in a transparent 
manner, delimitations was a necessity to make. These delimitations are explained below.   
Wilkinson (2014) wrote in the Oil & Gas Journal, reporting on a study conducted by the 
“Australian Bureau of Statistics and the Australian Petroleum Production & Exploration 
Association” (APPEA). The authors of the study concluded that the cost of drilling offshore in 
Australia has fivefold since 2003. The study reveals that the average cost of drilling an offshore 
well is more than 130 million AUD, which equals approximately to 100 million USD. Augustine 
et al. (2006) explains that the average onshore drilling cost in the U.S during 2003-2006 with an 
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average depth of 4092 meters was 2.9 million USD. These facts illuminate the cost differences 
between onshore and offshore oil and gas operations.  
Oil companies have different exposure to offshore operations. Higher exposure to offshore 
operations leads to higher finding and development costs as well as operation costs. Onshore and 
offshore drilling costs can differ greatly in any given country, accounted by different factors such 
as drilling time and geological complexity. Due to the complexity of this matter, no consideration 
will be given to the level of exposure to offshore, respectively onshore, operations that a 
company participates in when calculating its finding and development costs.  
Different countries and governments adopt different taxation on oil and gas companies. The 
production sharing contracts between governments and oil and gas companies states how much of 
the produced oil and gas that will accrue the government in terms of royalties and taxes, etc. The 
differences in fiscal terms result in differences in the valuation of an oil and gas companies oil 
and gas reserves. Due to the complexity of this matter, this study will not take differences in 
taxation, and fiscal terms in production sharing contracts into consideration when analyzing the 
empirical data of this research. 
Oil and gas exploration and production is associated with environmental risks, e.g. the 25th year 
anniversary of Exxon Valdez (Walters, 2014) last year and, more recently, BP´s disaster with 
Deepwater Horizon (Paton, 2015). The risks of exploitation of oil and gas can lead to 
environmental and monetary cost and concerns, but due to the complex nature of these risks and 
costs, they will not be consolidated in this study. 
2. Theoretical framework 
In the first section of this chapter, a presentation is given to previous research which carries 
relevance to this study. The second section contains a discussion of general characteristics and 
definitions of the oil and gas industry that are keen for this study. In section three, some of the 
commonly used methods for valuation of oil and gas companies are mentioned. In the fourth and 
final section, some of the commonly used definitions of finding and development costs are 
presented.  
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2.1 Previous research 
Whilst researching which earlier studies have been conducted in the field examined in this study, 
there was no academic work found that makes a direct comprehension between finding and 
development costs and acquisition costs of oil and gas companies. Although, some relevant 
studies were found in these researches, these studies are presented in this section.                                                                                 
In “Valuing Barrels of Oil Equivalent” Smith (2014) explores differences in the valuation of 
barrels of oil equivalent (BOE), in two different conversion measurements.  Smith states in the 
abstract of his study that “... the extent of bias in estimates of value, cost and profitability is 
indeed large”. The author explains that combined volumes of oil and gas are measured by barrels 
of oil equivalent, which is the aggregate of a relative thermal content of two energy sources.  
Smith (2014, p. 1) further states that one “barrel of oil is usually counted as equivalent to 6 MCF 
(thousand cubic feet) of gas”. Smith stresses that the ratio between the price of a barrel of oil and 
thousand cubic feet of gas is often larger than 6, the thermal conversion ratio. Smith concludes 
that a BOE with a high ratio of oil is worth more than a BOE with a low ratio of oil. This means 
that the higher oil/gas ratio the BOE has, the more lucrative it is to develop it. The historic oil/gas 
price ratio is presented in figure 3 below. 
             
 
Figure 3. WTI Cushing oil spot price ($ per barrel) divided by Henry Hub Natural gas price ($ per million BTU). Sources: U.S. 
Energy Information Administration [2], 2015 and U.S. Energy Information Administration [3], 2015 
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According to Silverman (2015) one cubic foot of gas equals 1030 BTU. Therefore, one MCF 
equals 1 030 000 BTU. The U.S. Energy Information Administration presents historical gas 
prices in USD/million BTU ≈ USD/MCF. BTU is used in figure 3 above.  
 
Smith explains that a BOE with thermal equivalence is calculated as: 
𝐵𝑂𝐸(𝑡) =  𝑄𝑜 +
𝑄𝑞
6
𝑄𝑜 = 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑖𝑙 (𝐵𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑠) 
𝑄𝑞 = 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑎𝑠 (𝑀𝐶𝐹)
 
 
Furthermore, a BOE with economic equivalence is calculated as: 
𝐵𝑂𝐸(𝑒) =  𝑄𝑜 + 𝑄𝑞 ∗ (
𝑃𝑞
𝑃𝑜
)
𝑃𝑔 = 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑎𝑠 ($ 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑀𝐶𝐹)
𝑃𝑜 = 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑖𝑙 ($ 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙)
 
 
Smith concluded that there were large valuation differences when using thermal or economic 
equivalent of BOE. For example, the author found that the finding and development cost (FDC) 
for Chevron during 2011-2013, using thermal equivalent BOE, was 36.35 USD while using 
economic equivalent to the FDC was 49.59 USD. The same comparison for ExxonMobil resulted 
in FDC using BOEt of 25.14 USD and FDC using BOE(e) of 44.4 USD. These differences do 
indeed provide empirical evidence that there are major differences between the usages of the 
thermal conversion vs. the economic conversation.  
As pointed out by Smith (2014); the definition of BOE with thermal equivalent does not 
considerate that the price of oil and gas differ, even when calculating price/thermal content. This 
fact makes the use of BOE with thermal conversion irrational when comparing the economic 
value of oil and gas companies’ reserves. Therefore, this study will rely on the definition of BOE 
with economic conversion (BOEe) when comparing economic values.   
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One weakness, as well as strength, with the economic conversion of BOE is the matter of 
reoccurring fluctuations in oil and gas prices. These price fluctuations will lead to that 
fluctuations of BOE with the economic conversion will be more dramatic than the fluctuations of 
the BOE with thermal conversion.    
Adelman & Watkins (2004) concluded in their study “Costs of Aggregate Hydrocarbon Reserve 
Additions” that the costs of finding new oil reserves is difficult to subdivide between oil and gas 
reserves. The authors argue that the use of barrels of oil equivalent with thermal conversion 
creates economic fictions. Adelman & Watkins (2004, p. 20) state that “the validity of a thermal 
conversion factor rests on oil and gas being close substitutes overall end uses… the aggregation 
technique preferred by industry, the investment community and governments has been to 
translate gas to oil ‘equivalent’ by using a fixed physical thermal conversion factor or a factor 
intended to some fixed BTU price equivalence…”.  
 
2. 2 Characteristics and definitions of the oil and gas branch 
2.2.1 Oil and Gas Reserves 
The replacement of fading reserves is keen for companies that operate in the commodity sector.  
In the oil and gas industry, there are different classifications of reserves and resources. According 
to the Society of Petroleum Evaluation Engineers (2007) reserves are defined as “those quantities 
of oil and gas anticipated to be economically recoverable from discovered resources”. 
Furthermore discovered resources are “... those quantities of oil and gas estimated on a given 
date to be remaining in, plus those quantities already produced from, known accumulations”. 
Discovered resources consist of recoverable resources (i.e. reserves) and unrecoverable resources. 
2.2.2 Reserves Categories  
The Society of Petroleum Evaluation Engineers (2007) recognizes that geological and 
engineering knowledge, as well as professional judgment, are required to estimate reserves. 
Reserves are mainly based on analysis of drilling, geological, geophysical and engineering data. 
The use of technology and economic conditions are also used to quantify reserves. The 
relationship between resources and reserves is visualized in figure 4 and discussed further below.   
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Figure 4. The relationship between resources and reserves. 
 
Proved oil reserves are defined by Society of Petroleum Evaluation Engineers (2007, p. 10) as 
“reserves that can be estimated with a high degree of certainty to be recoverable”.  Proved 
reserves, 1P, (conservative estimate) have a 90 % probability of recovery. 
Probable reserves are defined by the same society as “those additional reserves that are less 
certain to be recovered than proved reserves” by Society of Petroleum Evaluation Engineers 
(2007, p. 10). Proved + Probable reserves, 2P, (realistic estimate) have 50 % probability of 
recovery. 
Furthermore, possible reserves are defined by the Society as “those additional reserves that are 
less certain to be recovered than probable reserves”. Proved + probable + possible reserves, 3P, 
(optimistic estimate) have a 10 % probability of recovery according to the Society of Petroleum 
Evaluation Engineers (2007, p. 10). 
Another important type of resource is the Contingent resources. This category is described by the 
Society of Petroleum Evaluation Engineers (2007, p. 10) as “those quantities of oil and gas 
estimated on a given date to be potentially recoverable from known accumulations but are not 
currently economic. Contingent resources include, for example, accumulations for which there is 
currently no viable market”.  
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According to the Society of Petroleum Evaluation Engineers (2007) proved + probable reserves 
(2P) is the most realistic estimate of oil reserves. Furthermore, proved reserves (1P) are 
considered to be a relative conservative estimate. When oil and gas companies in financial 
statements report on the net change in reserves, the amounts are of the category “proved 
reserves”. Due to how the oil and gas companies report on the net change in reserves, 
calculations in this study will be performed with 1P reserves in the denominator.  
Undiscovered future recoverable resources are an estimate of future production and are referred 
to as prospective resources (Society of Petroleum Evaluation Engineers, 2007).  
2.2.3 Strategic and political characteristics 
Nie & Dowell (2012) wrote about how China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC), a state-
owned oil company, tried to purchase an American oil company (Unocal). The authors explained 
how 41 members of the U.S. Congress demanded “a rigorous review of CNOOC’s bid. The 41 
Congress men argued that the offer was not a free market transaction and that it was part of an 
attempt to control energy resources and influence in Asia” (Nie & Dowell, 2012, p. 49). 
Furthermore, the U.S. Department of Defense warned that a potential takeover of Unocal by 
CNOOC could give China access to deep-sea drilling technology that could be used for military 
purposes. The Pentagon claimed that a “Communist ownership of a U.S. oil company could 
present a national security risk”. The story ended with Chevron purchasing Unocal while the 
Chinese government and CNOOC backed off. 
The takeover of Dana Petroleum by Korea National Oil Company is another example where the 
strategic importance of oil assets triggered an acquisition. In a press release, the former chairman 
of Dana Petroleum, Colin Goodall, commented “... KNOC has an urgent need for reserves and 
production to meet its published corporate targets, set by national priorities.  Dana's assets and 
operational management teams are of strategic importance to KNOC and Dana shareholders 
should rightly demand a full and fair value for surrendering control of a strong independent 
company, with high quality assets dominated by OECD oil production.” (Dana Petroleum, 2010) 
The statement was an attempt to defend Dana Petroleum from a takeover, this attempt failed, and 
Dana was acquired by KNOC. 
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2.2.4 The price of oil 
The price of oil is highly volatile and can affect the investment sentiment of decision makers 
within oil and gas companies. The historic price of crude oil is presented in figure 5 below.  
 
Figure 5. The price of oil, 1946-2014. Source: (McMahon, 2014) 
 
Low oil prices make decision makers more restrictive, e.g., Royal Dutch Shell plc (2015) 
reported that the company will cut their capital spending during 2015-2017 by minimum 15 
billion USD due to lower oil prices. Scheyder (2015) reported that Chevron plans to cut their 
capital expenditure by 13% in 2015 compared to 2014. Furthermore, Chevron's CEO John 
Watson marked that “some projects would not be able to compete internally for capital with oil 
prices CLc1 below $110 per barrel”. 
 
2.3 Reserves increment through acquisitions   
The oil and gas industry, along with other commodity industries, is of a somewhat different 
nature than many other industries. For example, there is the matter of exhaustible resources that 
need to be considered when evaluating an oil and gas company (Howard & Harp, 2009). Methods 
0
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for evaluation oil and gas companies might be of an econometric nature such as techniques 
presented by Mohn (2008). Other authors suggest methods with emphasis on cash flows, e.g., 
Howard & Harp (2009). Meanwhile, some authors discuss models that focus on the net present 
value of proved reserves (Adelman & Watkins, 1992) as determinants of the economic value of 
an oil and gas company.   
As sophisticated these different kinds of evaluation methods might be, they might be more 
suitable as consultancy when making difficult investment decisions. The results of these 
calculations will not necessary represent the price an oil major needs to pay when looking to 
replace their fading oil and gas resources through acquisition of a smaller oil and gas company. 
These thoughts will be rationalized and discussed more in the method section of this study, along 
with a presentation of the approach used in this study when estimating the price tag of 
incrementing BOE through acquisitions.   
 
2.4 Reserves increment through exploration  
Wright & Gallun (2008) explains that finding costs are an important performance measure that is 
difficult to define. The authors argue that the difficulties derive from the lack of “consensus 
regarding which costs should be included as finding costs” (Wright & Gallun, 2008, p. 711). The 
timing of when finding costs occur and when the new reserves are recognized is also problematic. 
Wright and Gallun (2008, p. 712) further explain that reserves can be “added through discoveries 
and extensions, purchases of reserves in place, revisions in reserve estimates and enhanced 
recovery”. 
Bush & Johnston (1998) argue that calculating the costs of finding oil and gas is difficult to 
practice due to the magnitude of variables like discoveries, acquisitions, revisions, enhanced 
recovery, and conversion of gas to oil. Furthermore, the authors describe three methods of 
calculating finding costs: 
𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑 𝐴: 
Exploration expense only 
Reserve additions (excluding revisions)
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𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑 𝐵: 
Exploration expense only 
Reserve additions (including revisions)
 
 
𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑 𝐶: 
Exploration and development expense 
Reserve additions (including revisions +  enhanced recovery)
  
 
Method C is called "finding and development cost" (FDC). Acquisition costs are sometimes 
included, which is problematic due to the lack of standardization (Bush & Johnston, 1998). Oil 
and gas companies regularly engage independent reserve engineering consultants to evaluate the 
company’s oil and gas reserves. These third-party evaluations are the fundament of the oil and 
gas reserves and resources estimates later presented in the company’s annual reports.  
The Energy Information Administration (2015) states that extensions are defined as “The 
reserves credited to a reservoir because of enlargement of its proved area. Normally the ultimate 
size of newly discovered fields, or newly discovered reservoirs in old fields, is determined by 
wells drilled in years subsequent to discovery. When such wells add to the proved area of a 
previously discovered reservoir, the increase in proved reserves is classified as an extension”.  
Furthermore U.S. Energy Information Administration (2015) explains that revisions are defined 
as “Changes to prior year-end proved reserves estimates, either positive or negative, resulting 
from new information other than an increase in proved acreage (extension). Revisions include 
increases of proved reserves associated with the installation of improved recovery techniques or 
equipment. They also include correction of prior report year arithmetical or clerical errors and 
adjustments to prior year-end production volumes to the extent that these alter reported prior 
year reserves estimates.”  
Schlumberger (2015) explains that the world wide average recovery factor for an oilfield is 
approximately 40%. This means that about 60% of an oilfield is left untapped because of 
technical and economic factor. The purpose of enhanced oil recovery (EOR) is to increase the 
recovery factor and thereby increase the recoverable volume of oilfields. Schlumberger further 
declares, “the difficulty is ensuring the proper chemical interaction and subsequent flow 
conformance of the EOR sweep front to recovery more oil, more quickly. Making the right 
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parametric decisions regarding a chosen EOR technique, while evaluating dynamic economic 
conditions, compounds these complex challenges”.  
 
In a study conducted by Gaddis et al. (1992) the finding costs of ten of the largest American oil 
and gas companies during 1986-1990 was studied. The companies that were studied were 
Amoco, ARCO, Chevron, Conoco, Exxon, Marathon, Mobil, Philips, Texaco, and Unocal. The 
authors concluded that there were large differences in finding costs depending on which 
definition is used (e.g. Method A, Method B or Method C). The results of their efforts are 
presented in the figure 6 below.  
 
Figure 6. Average Finding Costs in USD with Method A, B and C. Source: (Gaddis et al. 1992) 
 
Average finding cost with method A was 4.86 USD, with B 2.56 USD, with C 5.22 USD. Gaddis 
et al. (1992) also provided the average FDC (calculated with “Method C”) for the companies 
during different years. The findings are presented in figure 7 below.   
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Figure 7. Average Finding Costs with method C (FDC). Source: (Gaddis, Brock & Boynton, 1992) 
 
Figure 7 illustrates the differences in average finding and development cost (Method C) for the 
same companies. During 1988-1990, the average FDC was 5.11 USD, during 1986-1990 the 
average FDC was 5.22 USD, during 1989-1993 the cost was 5.28 USD.  
(Bush & Johnston, 1998) highlights the importance of using one method consequently when 
calculating and comparing finding costs between oil companies.  
3. Methodology 
The methodology of this thesis is derived from its theoretical framework. This chapter contains a 
briefing upon the methods that are used to enable for the contemplation and gathering of 
empirical data. In the second part of this chapter, the tools that are relied upon in order to conduct 
an analysis of the empirical data are presented.  
3.1 Marginal costs 
To enable for a comprehension between the replacement costs of the major oil and gas 
companies, the use of marginal costs is a distinctive and intuitive method. Frank (2009, p. 303) 
writes, “Marginal costs… is the change in total cost that results from producing an additional 
unit of output”. In this study, the marginal cost is defined as the additional cost for a company to 
add one more barrel of oil equivalent (BOE) to their reserves.   
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1988-1990 1986-1990 1989-1993
FDC (Method C) in USD
16 
 
 
 
3.2 Gathering of the empirical data  
The empirical data related to prospection and exploration activities (FDC) are mainly gathered 
from the examined companies’ annual reports and will be delimited to consolidated subsidiaries, 
no consideration will be given to associated entities.   
Data that describes takeovers, on the other hand, are mainly gathered from the involved 
companies’ press releases. In similarity to the marginal cost of incrementing oil reserves through 
exploration and prospection, a marginal cost of incrementing oil and gas reserves through 
acquisitions is calculated.  
3.2.1 FDC of BOEe  
The FDC will be calculated in accordance with “Method C” as described by Bush & Johnston 
(1998). In this paper, the economic conversion is the chosen approach when contemplating the 
results of joint oil and gas operations. The formula for calculating FDC is: 
𝐹𝐷𝐶 =  
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 (𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 +  𝑒𝑛ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦)
 
This formula does need a minor manipulation as the examined companies operate with both oil 
and gas commodities. The target of the manipulation will be the denominator as it should, in this 
study, represent the oil and gas operations as a joint venture.  
The denominator will be handled as the result of the “Reserve additions (including revisions + 
enhanced recovery”) for oil and gas activities combined, as BOE with economic conversion.       
 
The economic conversion of BOE is calculated as: 
𝐵𝑂𝐸(𝑒) =  1𝑃 𝑔𝑎𝑠 𝑜𝑖𝑙 (𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑠) + 1𝑃 𝑔𝑎𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠(𝑀𝐶𝐹) ∗
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑎𝑠 ($ 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑀𝐶𝐹)
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑖𝑙 ($ 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙)
 
This yields that the FDC with the economic conversion will be calculated as: 
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𝐹𝐷𝐶𝐵𝑂𝐸 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐
=  
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 
1𝑃 𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 (𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑠) + 1𝑃 𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑔𝑎𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠(𝑀𝐶𝐹) ∗
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑎𝑠 ($ 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑀𝐶𝐹)
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑖𝑙 ($ 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙)
 
3.2.2 Companies FDC that will be examined 
This study focuses on the FDC of the ten largest listed oil and gas companies, according to the 
market value in USD per 2015-04-15. The FDC of the following oil and gas companies presented 
in figure 8 will be calculated and analyzed: 
  
Figure 8. Market capitalization in billion USD. Source: Google Finance 2015-04-15 
 
3.3 The marginal cost of acquisitions 
The FDC will be compared to the marginal cost that is derived from incrementing reserves 
through a takeover of another oil and gas company. This marginal cost of acquisitions will be 
calculated by the following formula:  
Marginal cost of incrementing oil and gas reserves through acquisition: 
𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑚
𝑜𝑏𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝐵𝑂𝐸)
 
The numerator will be defined by the total amount spent in eight different acquisitions. In these 
acquisitions eight larger oil and gas companies purchased smaller ones. The denominator will be 
the total amount of BOE obtained in each of the takeovers.  
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The acquisitions that are consolidated to the calculations are by the specimens below. 
Acquisitions that have been dismissed are for instance the takeover of Dana Petroleum by 
KNOC. Dana Petroleum does not audit 1P reserves solely and could therefore not be included in 
this study. The takeovers of XTO Energy, Petrohawk Energy Corporation and Progress Energy 
are not included in this study because they are mainly natural gas companies. Further the 
potential takeover of BG Group by Shell is not included because the transactions have not yet 
occurred. The main theme when choosing which acquisitions should be consolidated to the 
calculations was quality above quantity, which also explains that only eight acquisitions are 
consolidated. The selection of acquisitions was based on the following variables:  
 The target company was an oil company or an oil and gas company 
 Transaction value of minimum USD 1 billion 
 The transaction took place during 2005-2015 
 
Furthermore, Oil and gas companies can have operations with different type of oils and gases, i.e. 
light oil, heavy oil, bitumen and LNG (Liquid Natural Gas). To provide a fair and true picture, all 
these operations will be included when calculating FDC and marginal acquisition costs.  
3.4 Analysis of data 
In order to conduct a sophisticated analysis and draw conclusions about potential cost 
differences, some statistical tests will be performed. The framework of these tests is presented in 
this section chapter. In order to enhance the transparency, the analysis will be based on an 
averaged FDC as well as an averaged marginal cost of incrementing oil reserves through 
acquisitions. 
3.4.1 Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
A non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test can be used to determine whether there are any 
statistical significant differences between the means between two groups. The samples are related 
and the population cannot be assumed to be normal distributed (Field, 2013).   
The following hypothesis will be tested at a significance level of 95%:  
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𝐻0: 𝑠1 = 𝑠2
𝐻𝐴: 𝑠1 ≠ 𝑠2
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒
𝑠1 = 5 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐹𝐷𝐶
𝑠2 = 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
 
 
The statistics program SPSS will be used to perform the test.  
3.4.2 Regressions 
SPSS will also be used to perform statistical regressions. A brief introduction to regressions is 
given in the following quote in “Statistics for business and economics” by Cortinhas & Black 
(2012, p. 493) “Regression analysis is the process of constructing a mathematical model that can 
be used to predict or determine one variable or other variables”.     
The regression analysis will be performed in order to evaluate whether the market capitalization 
of the examined companies determines their cost of finding and develop reserves. It should be 
mentioned that market caps will be compared to the respective companies five years average 
FDC.     
3.5 Reliability 
The strengths in this study are the quantitative approach in the collection and the analysis of data. 
No interviews have been conducted which minimizes the risk of subjectivity and influences from 
possible biases. Possible weaknesses in this study are the limited amount of data. More data 
would increase the credibility of the study. An aspect that also decreases the reliability of this 
study is the fact that the FDC is compiled from the years 2009-2013 while the studied 
acquisitions spans from 2005-2015. The time span for acquisitions was increased from the 
original intent to observe acquisitions between the years 2009-2013 to 2005-2015, because of the 
lack of transactions during 2009-2013. This can be viewed as a trade-off where more data points 
were considered to be more valuable than the decrease in reliability from comparing FDC and 
marginal costs from acquisitions from different time spans.  
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4. Empirical Findings 
This chapter contains a presentation of empirical data, gathered and calculated according to the 
methods described in the methodology chapter. The data of this chapter will be analyzed, 
commented and explained in the succeeding analysis chapter.  
 
In table 1 below the companies, total expenditures on exploration and development of reserves 
are presented. The table also contains the “output” of these expenses in the form of barrels of oil 
equivalent (BOE) with thermal and economic conversion. In the column that is named “FDC 
(BOE ‘type of conversion’)” the exploration plus development expenses is divided by the net 
change in reserves from the prior year. Therefore, FDC can be contemplated as a form of 
marginal costs for exploration and developing reserves. In some cases there is a negative FDC, 
this was due to some major negative revisions of prior estimates.  
The exploration and development expenses, oil and gas reserves was gathered from the 
companies’ annual reports. In terms of oil and gas prices, the yearly average price of each 
commodity was used when calculating BOEe with the following formula presented in the 
methodology:   
𝐵𝑂𝐸(𝑒) =  1𝑃 𝑔𝑎𝑠 𝑜𝑖𝑙 (𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑠) + 1𝑃 𝑔𝑎𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠(𝑀𝐶𝐹) ∗
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑎𝑠 ($ 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑀𝐶𝐹)
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑖𝑙 ($ 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙)
 
As explained in the methodology, the FDC per BOEe was calculated as  
𝐹𝐷𝐶𝐵𝑂𝐸 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐
=  
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 
1𝑃 𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 (𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑠) + 1𝑃 𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑔𝑎𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠(𝑀𝐶𝐹) ∗
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑎𝑠 ($ 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑀𝐶𝐹)
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑖𝑙 ($ 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙)
 
 
In appendix 1, a spreadsheet containing all data and calculations from which the table 1 below 
was derived. 
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Table 1. Exploration and development costs (FDC) in millions of USD. BOE in millions. FDC in USD per BOEe.    
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The results in column “FDC BOE (Economic)” in table 1 above explains how much each 
company invested in exploration and development of oil and gas to add one BOEe per year. It is 
obvious that there are large differences in the FDC per BOEe from year to year and between the 
companies.  
Table 2 below contains the five years average FDC with thermal and economic conversion for the 
respective company. Table 2 can be viewed as a summarizing of table 1. As seen in table 2, there 
are large differences in FDC, even when using five years averages.   
 
Table 2. Five year average FDC per 1P BOE with thermal and economic conversion 
Figure 9 below visualizes the five years average FDC for a BOEe 
 
Figure 9. 5 years average FDC (1P economic BOE) 
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Table 3 below contains the acquisitions that matched the specimens of the methodology chapter. 
The column named as “Marginal Cost” is calculated as the purchase price divided by the acquired 
amount of BOEe.  
 
Table 3. Acquisitions 
Figure 10 below is a visualization of the marginal cost of acquisitions presented in table 3.  
 
Figure 10. Marginal cost of acquisitions (1P economic BOE) 
 
The results in the column “Marginal Cost” in table 3 above explains how much the acquiring 
company had to gain access to the target company’s BOEe. As with the FDC, there are large 
differences between the “Marginal Costs”. Further analysis and possible reasons for the large 
differences will be conducted in the analysis chapter. In Appendix 2 the reader can find the 
spreadsheet from which table 3 above was derived.  
Table 4 below contains descriptive statistics for the data presented in table 2 and 3. The table 
provides the fact that the marginal cost of incrementing reserves through acquisitions (presented 
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as “takeovers”) exceeds the five year average of FDC with approximately 107.8 %. This suggests 
that it was more expensive for oil and gas companies to increment their oil and gas reserves 
(BOEe) by acquiring other companies than exploring and developing on their own. The statistics 
also shows that there is a large standard deviation in both of the data sets. The above stated 
results and findings will be analyzed and discussed in the following chapter.  
 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
5 Analysis 
This chapter contains comments and analysis of the preceding chapter. To further evaluate the 
differences between FDC and the marginal costs of takeovers, some statistical tests are performed 
and commented.  
5.1 Costs and outcomes of exploration and development vs. acquisition 
activities  
All oil and gas companies have different characteristics in the form of operating costs, future 
potential reserves (2P/2C), taxation, royalties, the proportion of 1P to 2P reserves, strategic assets 
and so on. Therefore, a general formula or model to evaluate all these businesses would be 
complex. The volatile prices of oil and gas are other variables that make the valuation task even 
more complex. These complexities also apply when comparing FDC and marginal acquisition 
costs.  
In this study, the differences in the two costs will be viewed as, more or less, universal indicators 
for the price that the oil and gas companies will face when increment their oil and gas reserve 
(BOEe). This view is a generalization, but still it serves as an indicator. 
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5.2 Related samples tests  
In this section, the discrepancy between FDC for a BOEe and the marginal cost of acquisitions is 
tested for statistical significance. The test will be commented upon and discussed.   
 
Since:  
𝐻0: 𝑠1 = 𝑠2
𝐻𝐴: 𝑠1 ≠ 𝑠2
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒
𝑠1 = 5 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐹𝐷𝐶 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝐵𝑂𝐸𝑒 
𝑠2 = 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
 
SPSS yielded the following output to the test:  
 
Table 5. Nonparametric tests between 5 years average FDC with economic conversion (1P) and Marginal cost of acquisitions 
with economic conversion (1P) 
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The null hypothesis should be retained. This leads to the conclusions that the descriptive 
difference between the 5 years average FDC of the then examined companies and the marginal 
cost of acquisitions is not statistical significant at a significance level of 95%. The lack of 
statistical significance of the test results could be explained by the small sample size and the high 
standard deviations.  
The calculations of BOE with economic conversion (as well as the thermal conversion 
calculations) yielded some negative values. As mentioned earlier, this is due to some major 
negative revisions of prior estimates of reserves, which may have contributed to the high standard 
deviations.  
With facts above considered, the question remains on how much the results of the Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank test really should be relied upon as a legitimate determent of the statistical 
significant difference between FDC and the marginal cost of acquisitions.  
As seen in figure 9 and 10, there are apparently some takeovers and FDCs that stands out. These 
outliers will be further analyzed in the following section.  
 
5.2.1 Analyze of outliers 
As mentioned, the non-significant result from the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test can partly be 
explained by the high standard deviations. The large standard deviations can be explained by 
some extreme outlier values in the data sets. In the FDC data set, presented in table 2, Royal 
Dutch Shell, CNOOC and Sinopec stands out as extreme values. Royal Dutch Shells extreme 
FDC could be derived from the company’s commitment to exploration in the Artic Sea. Shell 
invested USD 5 billion in 2013 on Arctic drilling “without any tangible result” (Macalister, 
2014). Another explanatory factor could be the escalating development costs of Gorgon project 
where the original budget of USD 37 billon has been increased by USD 17 billion. Shell have a 
25% stake in Gorgon project (Macdonald-Smith, 2014). CNOOC’s negative FDC of -55.8 USD 
per economic BOE can be explained by the company’s large downward revisions in its gas 
reserves, presented in appendix 1. An additional explanatory factor could be the fluctuations in 
the prices of oil and gas. The FDC with thermal conversion for CNOOC was 22.5 USD, this 
indicates that the prices of the commodities had an influence on CNOOC’s FDC.  
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The marginal cost of acquisitions that is most remarkable is Glencore Xstratas purchase of 
Caracal Energy for 71.8 USD per BOE with economic conversion. According to Caracal Energy 
Inc (2014), the company had 1P reserves of 18.8 million BOE and 4.1 billion of prospective 
resources at year-end 2013. In other words, Caracal Energy had significant future potential in 
terms of oil and gas reserves and production at the time Glencore Xstrata acquired Caracal. This 
can be an explanatory factor in Glencore willingness to pay 71.8 USD per BOEe at that time.   
In the studied takeovers, India Natural Oil and Natural Gas Company’s purchase of Imperial 
Energy yielded the lowest marginal cost of acquisitions as of 1P BOEe. This could be explained 
by the fact that 100% of Imperial Energy’s operations are located in Russia. The high-risk 
political environment of Russia could be an explanatory factor for the low marginal cost of 
acquisition of Imperial energy (3.3 USD per BOEe).  
5.3 Regression – FDC and Market Capitalization     
The purpose of this section is to examine whether the market capitalization of an oil and gas 
company has an effect on its FDC. A regression test was conducted using SPSS. Market 
capitalization was chosen as the predictor variable and five years average FDC as the outcome 
variable. The results of the test are presented below in table 6, 7 and 8.  
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 ,017a ,000 -,125 32,2485 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Market Cap 
Table 6. Regression - Model Summary 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Regression between FDC and Market Cap 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 14,653 20,138  ,728 ,488 
Market Cap ,005 ,098 ,017 ,049 ,962 
a. Dependent Variable: 5y Avg FDC thermal 
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Figure 11. Scatter Plot - FDC and Market Cap 
The regression is very weak; the test yielded a coefficient of determination (r2) of 0.000 and an 
adjusted r2 of -0.125, which is illustrated in table 6. The lack of correlation is also visualized in a 
scatter plot, figure 11 above. According to these findings, there is no correlation at all between 
the market cap of the examined companies and their cost of prospecting and commercializing oil 
and gas reserves (BOEe). The development and exploration costs are direct costs and could, 
therefore, explain the similarities between the FDC of smaller and larger oil and gas companies. 
If some overhead cost was included, the FDC for larger oil and gas companies would probably be 
larger than for smaller companies.   
 
5.4 Incitements for mergers and acquisitions 
Given that the five years average FDC per BOEe was USD 13.7 and the marginal cost of 
acquisitions was USD 28.48, why would an oil and gas company consider purchasing another 
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company? This question is indirectly addressed in the purpose of this thesis as this study also was 
set illuminate the economic dynamics and decisions of the branch. 
Even though exploration and commercialization seems to be the most cost effective alternative to 
increment oil and gas reserves, several benefits can be obtained from acquisitions of other 
companies. By acquiring another company, the buyer can reduce the competition in a region, 
segment or country, which can add value. As mentioned by Nie & Dowell (2012), takeovers can 
be performed with large strategic and political motives, for example, the takeover of Unocal by 
Chevron. This is an aspect that is difficult to quantify and assign a value to. Access to new 
technology can also be a motive to acquire another company within the oil and gas industry. 
Furthermore, takeovers can create operational and financial synergies that create value. The 
above discussed motivations for takeovers can be an explanatory factor to why some companies 
are willing to pay more than their FDC when acquiring another company, this could also explain 
the significant bid price premiums mentioned in the background of this study. 
6 Conclusions & Discussion  
The questions at issue of this thesis is: while looking to increment fading oil and gas reserves, are 
there any cost differences between acquisitions of companies with proven reserves as opposed to 
the prospection and commercialization of unexploited resources? 
The non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test suggests that the null hypothesis should be 
retained, which means that there is no difference between the five years average FDC and the 
marginal cost of takeovers. However, the results from this test was not statistical significant.  
There are indications that the alternative to prospect and commercialize oil and gas reserves in 
own regime is the more cost effective approach to increment reserves. The five years average 
FDC was USD 13.7 and the margin cost of acquisitions was USD 28.48. The findings in this 
paper was not statistical significant, but given the mentioned unfavorable circumstances of the 
Wilcoxon Signed rank test, the findings are believed to serve as, at least, an indicator. The large 
standard deviations and the small sample size was contributory sources that made the test non-
significant. To reduce the large standard deviation, the outliers could have been removed and a 
new test could have been conducted. Due to the already small data sets, especially the takeovers 
data set, it was considered not to be appropriate to remove the outliers.  
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The large standard deviations in the “takeovers data set” indicates that the amount of BOEe 
cannot be used as the only variable to explain the takeover price. To cut back competition, 
political motives, national interest, financial synergies, access to new technology are some factors 
that can be explanatory to the large fluctuations in the marginal cost of acquisitions. It can with 
some certainty be said that oil and gas companies have more motives when acquiring other 
companies, than to solely increment their oil and gas reserves (BOEe).  
A complex aspect of the FDC is the fact that it can take several years from that an oil and gas 
company commits to exploration and development activities until it can book oil and gas reserves 
from that particular activity. This can lead to skewness when calculating FDC. A part of this 
effect can be reduced by using multiple year averages, as in this study. In this study, a five years 
average of FDC was used. A ten years average might have smoothened out the FDC and reduced 
the standard deviation in the data set. This could have increased the chance to obtain a statistical 
significant result.  
It is clear that the deliberations and incitements that shape the decision making in oil and gas 
industry are derived from a complex nature, difficult to concretize fully within the scope of this 
thesis. However, the findings of this study provide at least some evidence that acquisitions of oil 
and gas company may be done, or rejected, by other motives than a short termed interest of 
incrementing oil and gas reserves. Otherwise, the discrepancy between the FDC and the marginal 
cost of incrementing and reserves through acquisitions would serve as an argument, perhaps 
impossible to overcome, when the governance of an oil and gas company elaborates about how 
the reserves should be incremented.  
Furthermore, this study concluded that the market capitalization of an oil and gas company has 
no effect on its FDC. This can be explained by the fact that FDC only contains direct costs that 
are exploration costs and development costs. If some overhead cost had been included in the 
FDC, companies with larger market capitalization would probably have higher FDC than 
companies with smaller market capitalizations. 
To summarize, this study concludes that there is no difference between the five years average 
FDC and the marginal cost of acquisitions, though the test was not statistical significant. Some 
indications suggests that the more cost effective approach to increment oil and gas reserves is to 
explore and develop rather than acquiring other oil and gas companies. This study further 
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concludes that there is no correlation between the market capitalization of an oil and gas 
company and its FDC.  
6.1 Suggestions for further research   
As some analytics of the branch speculate that a new wave of mergers and acquisitions might be 
incoming as an effect of falling oil prices, it would perhaps be possible to make a new study like 
this one in the near future and consolidate a whole new set of data. More data does improve the 
quality and credibility of studies. The discrepancy between FDC and marginal costs of 
acquisitions would also deserve some more attention and through examination. A study with ten 
year average FDC and more takeovers would probably decrease the standard deviations within 
the data sets and increase credibility. Another possible study could be to evaluate possible cost 
differences for oil and gas companies trying to increment oil and gas reserves, where FDC is 
compared to asset sales between companies. Above all, more studies in the area like this one 
would benefit the accumulated knowledge of the industry and academia.  
6.2 Contribution 
Possible interested parties could be decision makers in oil- and gas companies of various sizes, 
institutional- and private investors, politicians and, of course, academia due to the lack of 
research on this subject. This thesis is to be viewed as an attempt to fill the mentioned holes of 
the academic regarding the cost effectiveness of the process of incrementing oil and gas reserves. 
Furthermore, the study discussed the incitements of the acquisitions of oil and gas companies.     
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7.1 Annual Reports  
The following companies’ annual reports where consulted when the FDC where calculated for 
the fiscal years 2009 – 2013:  
 Chevron 
 ExxonMobil (Exxon)  
 PetroChina 
 Sinopec 
 Royal Dutch Shell  
 Total  
 BHP Billiton (BHP)  
 British Petroleum (BP)  
 ConoccoPhillips  
 China National Offshore Oil (CNOOC)  
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7.2 Appendixes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BP OIL
2009 -55 378 203 526 2805 10396 13201 1094 3438 12.1 3.8
2010 -146 131 421 406 2706 9675 12381 677 1646 18.3 7.5
2011 -159 206 21 68 2413 10422 12835 339 1626 37.9 7.9
2012 -349 26 158 -165 4356 12553 16909 -39 751 -433.6 22.5
2013 -129 46 132 49 4811 13552 18363 731 4094 25.1 4.5
BP GAS
2009 853 1435 1117 3405
2010 -2206 2171 1659 1624
2011 554 266 803 1623
2012 -2036 831 1961 756
2013 667 2480 945 4092
Appendix 1 - FDC
Cushing WTI Spot price ($/barrel) Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price ($ per million BTU) 1 ft3 of natural gas yields ≈ 1030 BTU
2009 61.95 3.94
2010 79.48 4.37
2011 94.88 4
2012 94.05 2.75
2013 97.98 3.73
Changes in oil reserves are presented in millions of barrels and  gas reserves as billions of cubic feet
All amounts represent combined oil and gas expidentures and in millions of dollars
Year Revis. Exte./Discov. Impr. Recov. Total Explor. Costs Develop. Costs Exp.+ dev costs BO E(T) BO E(E) FDC BO E(T) FDC BO E E
ExxonMobil OIL
2009 -2225 142 0 -2083 3056 16166 19222 -1178 5296 -16.3 3.6
2010 368 182 5 555 2993 22359 25352 990 2639 25.6 9.6
2011 9418 1129 0 10547 2452 24538 26990 10599 755 2.5 35.8
2012 326 760 7 1093 2782 26171 28953 721 -2198 40.1 -13.2
2013 608 541 0 1149 2389 20067 22456 1350 1249 16.6 18.0
ExxonMobil GAS
2009 -248 5676 0 5428
2010 644 1964 0 2608
2011 39 271 0 310
2012 -2191 -39 0 -2230
2013 512 693 0 1205
Chevron OIL
2009 355 52 50 457 1924 11827 13751 1283 4985 10.7 2.8
2010 103 63 74 240 1578 15401 16979 292 322 58.2 52.7
2011 197 299 58 554 19112 15890 35002 1403 5119 24.9 6.8
2012 313 217 77 607 2439 20855 23294 885 1685 26.3 13.8
2013 322 78 57 457 3186 25876 29062 583 772 49.9 37.6
Chevron GAS
2009 569 4387 0 4956
2010 197 110 2 309
2011 415 4680 1 5096
2012 660 999 8 1667
2013 636 104 15 755
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Conocco OIL
2009 512 237 17 766 1517 6907 8424 885 765 9.5 11.0
2010 160 128 58 346 1566 6267 7833 556 1279 14.1 6.1
2011 100 301 82 483 2262 8241 10503 661 1087 15.9 9.7
2012 15 293 16 324 2169 12044 14213 379 340 37.5 41.7
2013 86 379 21 486 2355 13824 16179 729 1478 22.2 11.0
Conocco GAS
2009 394 319 3 716
2010 912 323 25 1260
2011 406 602 59 1067
2012 -274 578 27 331
2013 688 765 6 1459
BHP OIL
2009 42 20 1 63 488 2075 2563 144 488 17.8 5.3
2010 77 64 11 152 851 2006 2857 172 128 16.6 22.3
2011 7 5 23 35 675 2139 2814 184 894 15.3 3.1
2012 184 14 34 232 1272 6225 7497 330 592 22.8 12.7
2013 -71 220 14 163 719 7174 7893 248 513 31.9 15.4
BHP GAS
2009 29 275 180 484
2010 45 11 64 120
2011 793 96 4 893
2012 447 135 3 585
2013 -1180 1684 3 507
Royal Dutch Shell OIL
2009 1894 596 40 2530 3873 14961 18834 3594 683 5.2 27.6
2010 723 147 62 932 4371 13014 17385 1178 367 14.8 47.4
2011 84 311 2 397 5722 11135 16857 1057 473 15.9 35.6
2012 542 86 10 638 8685 18575 27260 483 396 56.4 68.9
2013 294 182 412 888 8685 23433 32118 1384 438 23.2 73.3
Royal Dutch Shell GAS
2009 2156 4225 0 6381
2010 331 1104 41 1476
2011 639 3322 0 3961
2012 -1583 638 16 -929
2013 2105 709 160 2974
CNOOC OIL
2009 137 140 0 277 1175 6133 7308 365 543 20.1 13.5
2010 30 256 0 286 1195 4711 5906 345 371 17.1 15.9
2011 67 238 1 306 1511 6296 7807 300 -23 26.0 -338.0
2012 111 312 0 423 2129 8054 10183 545 746 18.7 13.6
2013 -41 366 0 325 3015 11533 14548 475 909 30.7 16.0
CNOOC GAS
2009 197 328 0 525
2010 -593 948 0 355
2011 -356 311 9 -36
2012 -353 1087 0 734
2013 -85 982 0 897
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PetroChina OIL
2009 -192 1005 73 886 3706 20149 23855 1581 4223 15.1 5.6
2010 -78 877 74 873 6490 20512 27003 1620 4528 16.7 6.0
2011 -76 746 66 736 6055 20376 26432 1327 3578 19.9 7.4
2012 -16 737 86 807 6605 28062 34667 1841 6225 18.8 5.6
2013 -124 775 84 735 6986 26360 33346 1536 4832 21.7 6.9
PetroChina GAS
2009 -1273 5440 0 4167
2010 -1456 5936 0 4480
2011 -751 4298 0 3547
2012 -16 6217 0 6201
2013 -2707 7511 0 4804
Total OIL
2009 179 261 0 440 1326 8537 9864 554 713 17.8 13.8
2010 73 234 0 307 1460 8510 9970 550 1473 18.1 6.8
2011 -127 81 0 -46 1756 11931 13687 515 3363 26.6 4.1
2012 146 232 0 378 2363 14456 16819 532 937 31.6 17.9
2013 160 121 0 281 2453 19314 21767 381 609 57.2 35.8
Total GAS
2009 -212 897 0 685
2010 967 489 0 1456
2011 330 3035 0 3365
2012 -96 1022 0 926
2013 -851 1449 0 598
Sinopec OIL
2009 86 69 131 286 2352 8108 10460 299 97 35.0 107.6
2010 85 69 144 298 2541 7728 10269 323 165 31.8 62.1
2011 126 82 72 280 3344 8290 11634 410 791 28.4 14.7
2012 9 151 163 323 3653 11485 15138 426 628 35.5 24.1
2013 -10 175 0 165 3092 13228 16320 230 394 71.1 41.4
Sinopec GAS
2009 52 27 0 79
2010 23 45 81 149
2011 -74 849 4 779
2012 278 232 109 619
2013 -326 714 0 388
Comments:
BHP's fiscal years run from June to June
Exchange rate conversion for CNOOC, PetroChina and Sinopec was performed according to:
Amounts calculated with the exchange rate at  21.5.15
1 RMB = 0,161378 USD
Costs in RMB can be found in the companies annual reports 
Exchange rate conversion for Total was performed according to:
Amounts calculated with the exchange rate at  21.5.15
1 EURO =1.113648 USD
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